Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly Insurmountable Protection for Defendants Against First Amendment Retaliatory Claim by Greene, Abigail
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 1 Article 9 
Winter 2021 
Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly Insurmountable Protection for 
Defendants Against First Amendment Retaliatory Claim 
Abigail Greene 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abigail Greene, Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly Insurmountable Protection for Defendants Against First 
Amendment Retaliatory Claim, 86 MO. L. REV. () 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly 
Insurmountable Protection for Defendants 
Against First Amendment Retaliatory Claim  
Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019). 
Abigail Greene* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are more than 3,000 sheriffs’ departments in the United States 
with varying authority based on the state and county in which they are 
located.1  Their authority may be as wide reaching as a “full-service 
countywide law enforcement agenc[y]” or may be as limited as having “no 
law enforcement jurisdiction in county areas served by local or municipal 
police departments.”2  Dissimilar to other law enforcement officials, who are 
hired after an interview and application process, most sheriffs gain their 
positions through partisan elections.3  Offices in forty-one states – more than 
2,700 counties – conduct partisan elections for the sheriff position.4 
 
*B.J., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020; Lead Article 
Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021. I am grateful to Professor Christina Wells 
for her insight, guidance, and support during the writing of this Note, as well as the 
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.  
 1. Sheriffs’ Offices, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=72 [https://perma.cc/D9QD-GSKS] (last 
visited November 20, 2020). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Daniel M. Thompson, How Partisan Is Local Law Enforcement? Evidence 
from Sheriff Cooperation with Immigration Authorities (Aug. 20, 2019), 
http://chriswarshaw.com/lpe_conference/Thompson_Sheriffs_Immigration_Enforce
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPA4-CCLZ] (“Out of 3,142 counties or county 
equivalents, 3,083 in 46 states elect a county sheriff.”). 
 4. Id. (“Five states, and a small number of counties outside of these states, hold 
nonpartisan sheriff elections.”).  
1
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Although the length of an elected sheriff’s term varies by jurisdiction,5 
incumbency gives a candidate a significant advantage in an election.6  In a 
2017 study of the 200 largest jails in the United States, all but two of the 
current sheriffs were incumbents.7  In the course of a contested election, non-
incumbent candidates – who are employed by the sheriff as subordinate 
officers – may make statements criticizing the office in some way, and 
promising change for the future.  With such a large number of incumbents 
retaining office, however, those changes are rarely implemented, and 
sometimes the losing officer is subsequently fired by the incumbent sheriff 
after he or she wins the election.  While it might appear the employee was 
fired for speaking out during a political campaign – an area considered core 
protected speech under the First Amendment – the incumbent sheriff likely 
will not be liable for a First Amendment retaliation claim because he is 
shielded by qualified immunity.   
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that 
government officials are entitled to some form of immunity – absolute or 
qualified – if they meet the requirements of the defense.8  Immunity covers 
suits for damages in order to “shield [officials] from undue interference with 
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”9  While some 
individuals are entitled to absolute immunity, most officials, including law 
enforcement officers, are entitled to qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity 
is a controversial and complicated doctrine that is designed to protect law 
enforcement officers for actions taken in the line of duty.10  It has proved to 
be difficult and complex throughout the jurisdictions based on varying 
interpretations.  One common theme is clear: it is nearly impossible for a 
plaintiff to win against a government official because courts are so 
sympathetic to a defendant’s qualified immunity arguments.  
 





 6. Alex Clark, Exploring the staying power of elected sheriffs – a preliminary 
analysis, Prison Policy Initiative (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/08/24/sheriffs/ [https://perma.cc/5HX3-
V298]. 
 7. Id. District of Columbia and Miami-Dade County had appointed officials to 
the sheriff’s position. Id.  
 8. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). Absolute immunity is the 
stronger form of immunity, shielding from any liability “regardless of the conduct.”  
It is, however, granted to only a small group of government officials, such as judges. 
Monroe Bonnheim, Immunity and Justice for All: Has the Second Circuit 
Overextended the Doctrine of Absolute Immunity by Applying It to Arbitration 
Witnesses?, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 217 (2009); see discussion infra notes 63–69. 
 9. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.  
 10. Vogel Law Firm, Appeals Court Arrests Immunity Defense For Lewd-
Talking Sheriff, 10 No. 8 N.D. Emp. L. Letter 1 (2005). 
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This Note examines a recent decision by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit finding qualified immunity applicable to a 
sheriff when faced with a First Amendment retaliation suit based upon 
comments made during a political campaign.  Part II provides the facts and 
holding of Morgan.  Part III describes and analyzes the legal background of 
both a First Amendment retaliation claim and the defense of qualified 
immunity.  Part IV states the reasoning behind the Morgan decision.  Part V 
examines the potential practical consequences of the qualified immunity 
doctrine and the implications on plaintiffs who are seeking recourse.  Finally, 
Part VI summarizes the need to give less protection to incumbent sheriffs 
when First Amendment retaliatory actions are taken.  
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2014, Donald Morgan ran against Michael Robinson – the incumbent 
sheriff – in the primary election for sheriff of Washington County, Nebraska.11  
Robinson had been the county’s elected sheriff since 2000.12  Morgan had 
been a deputy with the sheriff’s department since 2002.13  Throughout the 
campaign, Morgan made various public statements about the sheriff’s 
department and his plans to improve it if he were elected.14  Robinson won 
the election.15  Six days after the election, Robinson terminated Morgan’s 
employment as deputy.16  Robinson claimed the reason for the termination 
was that Morgan violated the sheriff’s department’s rules of conduct in 
making his campaign statements.17  Specifically, the disciplinary action report 
stated Morgan violated the paragraphs concerning “false statements, slander, 
and honesty.”18  The statements in question were:  
1. You continued to state that the communications system was not 
completed after 10 years of construction although the record reflects it 
was completed on time and under budget in 2006[.] 
2. You stated the Fire and Rescue agencies could not communicate and 
stated someone would be hurt or killed if it was not fixed although the 
 
 11. Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 522 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 12. Morgan v. Robinson, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *1 (D. Neb. 
Dec. 8, 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated (Mar. 21, 2018), on reh’g en banc, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019), and rev’d 
and remanded, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 13. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 522; Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at 
*1. 
 14. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 522. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *1. 
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Fire Chiefs submitted a letter to the local paper saying your comments 
were false. 
3. You continued to tell the public that morale at the Sheriff’s Office 
was bad and that “all the employees were waiting for the day after I 
lost to see me walk out of the office”. [sic] You also stated several 
deputies were actively looking for employment. This was proven false 
when several of the Deputies were consulted and none were looking 
and did not know of any deputy looking for employment and I was 
overwhelmingly supported by the employees of the Sheriff’s Office. 
4. You stated the K-9 had been taken from you for retribution when in 
fact you demanded the K-9 be taken because it “hindered your ability 
to do your job”. [sic] 
5. You stated portable radio coverage was poor and continued to state 
the coverage was poor even after being shown the system coverage for 
portable radios was 99.2% county wide.19 
Initially, Morgan brought a grievance under a labor contract in place for 
his position, but the grievance was denied and that decision was upheld on 
appeal.20  Next, he brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District of 
Nebraska, alleging claims of “retaliation, deprivation of due process, and 
breach of the labor contract.”21  The court compelled arbitration, in conformity 
with the contract, and the arbitrator sustained the grievance, found in favor of 
Morgan and “reinstated his employment with the sheriff’s department.”22  In 
response, Robinson filed a motion to dismiss for summary judgment on the 
retaliation claim in the district court.23 
Upon returning to the district court, Robinson claimed he was entitled to 
qualified immunity on Morgan’s First Amendment retaliation claim.24  The 
district court denied that motion, finding “genuine issues of material fact 
regarding the constitutionality of the termination, and whether Robinson 
 
 19. Morgan v. Robinson, 881 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated (Mar. 21, 2018), on reh’g en banc, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 
2019). During the campaign, Morgan said:  
  (1) the county communications center had not been completed; (2) rural fire  
  departments lacked adequate radio systems; (3) the county needed more  
  deputies on the road; (4) the office budget did not consider the public’s needs; 
  (5) department morale was poor; (6) the department was not doing well; and 
  (7) people were leaving the office because they did not feel 
  respected.  
Morgan, 920 F.3d at 525. 
 20. Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *2. 
 21. Morgan, 881 F.3d at 650. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *2. 
 24. Morgan, 881 F.3d at 650–51. 
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should have reasonably known the termination was unlawful.”25  Robinson 
appealed the decision, and an Eighth Circuit panel affirmed.26  Then, the 
Eighth Circuit reheard the case en banc, vacated the panel decision, reversed 
and remanded.27  The court held that Robinson was entitled to qualified 
immunity because “the law was not sufficiently clear so that Robinson would 
have known that terminating him violated his First Amendment rights.”28 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND  
Section 1983 of the U.S. Code (“Section 1983”) allows an individual to 
sue government officials for money damages when that official causes a 
deprivation of the individual’s constitutional rights.29  Although “deceptively 
simple in its construction,” Section 1983 is in reality full of complex 
procedural issues.30  Section 1983 was adopted by Congress in 1871, and 
provides “private remedies in the form of money damages and injunctive 
relief for the infringement of constitutional rights.”31  The statute states in 
relevant part:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress… 32 
The Section became the “procedural keystone for the civil rights 
litigation of the 1960s” and continues to be a medium that tests the “limits of 
constitutional rights.”33  It provides protection only in the public sector, not 
the private sector.34  Further, “the definition of person has been broadly 
interpreted to include virtually any governmental entity, including cities, 
counties, townships, municipal corporations, and the wide variety of local and 
regional government entities.”35  Finally, Section 1983 provides a remedy of 
 
 25. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 522; Morgan, 2016 WL 10636372, at *5.  
 26. Morgan, 881 F.3d at 650. 
 27. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 523. 
 28. Id. at 527 (Shepherd, Kelly, and Erickson, JJ., dissenting) (citing Reichle v. 
Howards, 566 U.S. 659, 664 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2018). 
 30. 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3 (Originally published in 1993). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
 33. 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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both injunctive and monetary relief against the government entity or 
individual who has violated another’s constitutional rights.36 
A public sector employee may not be fired for any reason that violates 
that employee’s constitutional rights because termination “as a consequence 
for the making of critical comment, regardless of how motivated or directed, 
violates the individual’s protected right of freedom of speech, guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.”37  However, a public employee’s ability to exercise 
certain First Amendment rights may be restrained, legally, when “it could lead 
to inability of elected officials to get their jobs done on behalf of the public.”38  
In a case of retaliatory termination, which violates an individual’s First 
Amendment rights, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and prove: 
“(1) [h]is speech was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the governmental 
employer discharged him from employment; and (3) the protected speech was 
a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to take the 
adverse employment action.”39  Even if a plaintiff is able to establish a prima 
facie case, however, he will not prevail if the defendant is able to establish 
qualified immunity.40 
Qualified – or “good faith” – immunity is an affirmative defense that 
must be pleaded by a defendant official.41  The doctrine attempts to strike a 
balance between “the interest in preventing, and compensating for, 
constitutional violations and the interest in avoiding the overdeterrence of 
independent decision making by government officials.”42  The Supreme 
Court, in a handful of decisions starting in 1967, extended qualified immunity 
protection to “police officers, executives, school board members, mental 
hospital administrators, and prison officials.”43  “In essence, ignorance of the 
law is no more a valid excuse for a government official than for the average 
citizen.”44 
A. Evolution of the Qualified Immunity Test  
The modern test for the qualified immunity doctrine was created in 
1982.45  Since then, the Supreme Court and Appellate Courts have refined and 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Gentry v Lowndes County, Miss., 337 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2003); 22 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3.   
 39. 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3. 
 40. 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE 
LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 8:1 (2020). 
 41. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). 
 42. NAHMOD, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
 44. John P. Gross, Qualified Immunity and the Use of Force: Making the 
Reckless into the Reasonable, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 67, 73 (2017). 
 45. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. 
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expanded the doctrine.46  The numerous opinions, however, require 
“[o]ne…to work hard to find some doctrinal consistency or predictability in 
the case law [as] the circuits are hopelessly conflicted both within and among 
themselves.”47  The instability in the doctrine conveys the need of 
revamping.48   
1. Supreme Court 
Prior to 1982, there were two components to the qualified immunity test, 
an objective and subjective part.49  The Court held that “qualified immunity 
would be defeated if an official knew or reasonably should have known that 
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the 
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the 
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other 
injury…”50  The objective aspect “involves a presumptive knowledge of and 
respect for basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.”51  The subjective aspect 
“refers to permissible intentions.”52  However, the Court largely eliminated 
that subjective aspect in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.53   
In Harlow, petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield were 
“alleged to have participated in a conspiracy to violate the constitutional and 
statutory rights of … respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald.”54  Fitzgerald alleged 
Harlow and Butterfield joined the conspiracy “in their capacities as senior 
White House aides to former President Richard M. Nixon.”55  After Harlow 
and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, the court held that they were 
not entitled to absolute immunity.56  The Court discussed the two tiers of 
immunity, absolute and qualified.57  Absolute immunity applies to “officials 
whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection 
from suit,” such as “the absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative 
functions … of judges, in their judicial functions … and certain officials of 
 
 46. Congressional Research Service, Policing the Police: Qualified Immunity 
and Considerations for Congress, (June 25, 2020), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10492 [https://perma.cc/XC4Y-
7DT6].  
 47. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the 
Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 925 (2015). 
 48. Id. 
 49. NAHMOD, supra note 40. 
 50. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
 51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 816–18. 
 54. Id. at 802. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 805–06. 
 57. Id. at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7
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the Executive Branch.”58  In contrast, executive officials in general are subject 
to qualified immunity.59  These officials have “less discretionary 
responsibilities” than those who require the greater protection of absolute 
immunity.60  Officials that the Court has recognized qualify for this kind of 
immunity include “a governor and his aides” and “high federal officials of the 
Executive Branch.”61  The Court explained the acknowledgement of qualified 
immunity “reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only the 
importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, … but also 
the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and 
the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official 
authority.”62  Finally, the Court determined “the special functions of some 
officials might require absolute immunity,” but “federal officials who seek 
absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that 
scope.”63 
When examining the qualified immunity test in place at the time, the 
Court noted that the subjective element of qualified immunity is incompatible 
with the notion that insubstantial claims should not advance to trial because 
“an official’s subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of 
fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a 
jury.”64  Inquiries into an official’s subjective good faith, says the Court, “may 
entail broad-ranging discovery” and “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective 
government.”65  Conversely, the objective aspect of the test can be measured 
by clearly-established law and is compatible with the notion that insubstantial 
claims should not advance to trial.66  The threshold immunity question, 
therefore, is if the law was clearly established at the time, and “[i]f the law at 
that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be 
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, not could he fairly be 
said to know that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as 
unlawful.”67  Conversely, “[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official 
should know the law governing his conduct.”68  Nevertheless, if the official is 
able to claim extraordinary circumstances and “can prove that he neither knew 
 
 58. Id. (The covered Executive Branch officials include “prosecutors and similar 
officials… executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, and the President of 
the United States[.]”).   
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Id. at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 64. Id. at 815–16. 
 65. Id. at 816–17. 
 66. Id. at 818. 
 67. Id. at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Id. at 818–19. 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/9
2021] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM  327 
nor should have known the relevant legal standard,” the defense of qualified 
immunity can still be successful.69  Therefore, the Court held that 
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”70  This test focuses on the “objective 
legal reasonableness of an official’s acts.”71 
The Court concluded that Harlow and Butterfield were entitled to 
qualified immunity, recognizing it would be “untenable to hold absolute 
immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in 
the White House.”72  Additionally, the Court determined Harlow and 
Butterfield proved entitlement to immunity based on the “special functions of 
White House aides,” but only on a qualified immunity standard, as opposed 
to an absolute immunity standard.73  Absolute immunity may be warranted for 
some aides, specifically those “entrusted with discretionary authority in such 
sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy” because it “protect[s] 
the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest.”74  
This exemption does not cover “all Presidential aides in the performance of 
all their duties.”75  “In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a 
Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office 
embraced a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability” and 
“he was discharging the protected function when performing the act for which 
liability is asserted.”76  Conversely, “[t]he resolution of immunity questions 
inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available 
alternative.”77  The Court “relied on the assumption that this [qualified 
immunity] standard would permit [i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly 
terminated” when “identifying [it] as the best attainable accommodation of 
competing values.”78 
Therefore, the objective part of the qualified immunity test “imposes 
liability only for violations of clearly settled law which a defendant, in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances, has a duty to know… [w]here there 
was no clearly settled law at the time the defendant acted, the defendant 
escapes § 1983 damages liability.”79   
 
 69. Id. at 819. 
 70. Id. at 818. 
 71. Id. at 819. 
 72. Id. at 809. 
 73. Id. at 811–12 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 74. Id. at 812. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 812–13. 
 77. Id. at 813. 
 78. Id. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. NAHMOD, supra note 40. 
9
Greene: Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly Insurmountable Protection for D
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
328 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
Since the Harlow decision in 1982, the Supreme Court has only applied 
the Harlow standard in twenty-seven qualified immunity cases.80  Of those 
twenty-seven cases, the official prevailed in all but three.81  Groh v. Ramirez, 
decided in 2004, involved a “glaring mistake in a search warrant,”82 and Hope 
v. Pelzer, decided in 2002, involved “the use of a hitching post for prison 
discipline, in apparent violation of longstanding circuit precedent.”83  Finally, 
Malley v. Briggs, decided in 1986, “ordered a remand after rejecting (inter 
alia) an officer’s argument that so long as he does not lie, ‘the act of applying 
for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable.’”84  The Court’s precedent has 
not merely maintained the doctrine of qualified immunity, but has “doubl[ed] 
down on it, enforcing it aggressively against lower courts,” which ultimately 
sends a message to lower courts to “think twice before allowing a 
governmental official to be sued for unconstitutional conduct.”85   
Consequently, lower courts are left to translate the Court’s message as 
they hear thousands of cases involving qualified immunity.  Specifically, 
lower courts hear a multitude of First Amendment retaliation claims where 
qualified immunity is raised as a defense.  Appellate court decisions regarding 
First Amendment retaliation claims and Section 1983 are not uncommon, 
especially within the specific context of a sheriff’s department, but the results 
of such cases are complicated, especially when compared against other 
circuits.  While it is well settled law “that a state or local government cannot 
condition public employment on a basis that infringes upon a public 
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression, … 
the way that federal and state courts have applied the legal standards … has 
made it very difficult to predict the outcome in many free speech cases.”86  
Aspects like “the background and composition of a particular circuit or 
appellate panel may affect the way the balancing test is applied.”87  It is clear 
that “the doctrine of qualified immunity creates a fog of uncertainty 
surrounding constitutional rights.”88 
 
 80. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 39 (Univ. of Chi. L. Sch., 
Working Paper No. 610, 2017), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2070&context=pu
blic_law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/2P57-3F8N]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) 
 83. 536 U.S. 730, 741-46 (2002) 
 84. 475 U.S. 355, 345 (1986)  
 85. Baude, supra note 80, at 41. 
 86. William Herbert, Balancing Test and Other Factors Assess Ability of Public 
Employees to Exercise Free Speech Rights, N.Y. ST. B.J. 24 (2002). 
 87. Id. (“One circuit’s application of the balancing test may have little or no 
persuasive value in another circuit considering a case with similar facts.”). 
 88. Gross, supra note 45, at 82. 
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2. Appellate Court Cases Involving General Critical Speech 
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided 
a case involving a First Amendment retaliation claim advanced by two 
officers against the chief of a police department, based on comments made to 
each of them and other officers about police department matters.89  The police 
chief claimed qualified immunity and filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleading, seeking to dismiss the individual claims.90  The officers were 
suspended after the chief allegedly “illegally search[ed] and analyz[ed] 
recorded telephone conversations between other officers and superiors.”91  
The conversations concerned four matters: “(1) requesting criminal offender 
record information … about several individuals; (2) criticizing the deputy 
chief and other department management; (3) discussing the chief’s 
absenteeism and referring to him as ‘No Show Joe’; (4) discussing safety 
issues concerning the Dudley Station of the [police department].”92  Plaintiffs 
alleged that the personal discipline resulting from these matters caused 
damages due to their criticism of both “his job performance and the job 
performance of his deputies” and therefore was a violation of their free speech 
rights under the First Amendment.93  The district court rejected the chief’s 
claim of qualified immunity, and the First Circuit affirmed.94  The court 
recognized, however, that the relevant qualified immunity case law was 
generally in the chief’s favor, but because all inferences are drawn in favor of 
the plaintiff, the chief does not succeed.95  First, the court found that the 
speech could fall within an area of public concern, as the alleged complaints 
about the department could be relevant to conditions for the general public.96  
Second, the court found the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a constitutional 
violation.97  Third, the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity based on 
an argument that the law was unsettled at the time of the conduct: 
If plaintiffs’ criticism consisted of serious expression of concern, 
voiced in an appropriate manner, about the effect of their supervisors’ 
poor performance on public safety or other public matters, and 
appellant’s retaliation was primarily aimed at silencing their criticism 
for his own advantage, precedent would have clearly established that 
the balance of interests tipped decisively in plaintiff’s favor.98 
 
 89. Jordan v. Carter, 428 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 70–71. 
 93. Id. at 71. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 73. 
 97. Id. at 74. 
 98. Id. at 75. 
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Finally, the court determined that it could not award immunity to the 
sheriff because it rejected the sheriff’s argument that “a reasonable officer 
would not have realized the impropriety of his conduct.”99  Overall, the court 
cited the insufficient record as the basis for most of its conclusions.100 
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard 
a case brought by Patrick Cromer, a former employee of the sheriff’s 
department of Greenville County, South Carolina.101  Cromer alleged he was 
fired from the department as a result of his speech, after he joined a black 
officers association and made comments about “perceived racial 
discrimination in the sheriff’s office.”102  The association submitted a letter to 
the sheriff that discussed how the unwritten policies of the department had 
inhibited “the advancement of Black officers,” how black officers were 
receiving unequal treatment in several areas within the department, and 
alleged biases against black officers on the promotional boards.103  The sheriff 
blamed Cromer and denied each of the charges, in a response letter to the 
association.104  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
sheriff in his individual capacity,105 holding he was entitled to qualified 
immunity.106  The Fourth Circuit reversed on this point.107  Conversely, it 
affirmed on the district court’s holding that the sheriff, in his official capacity 
as a state official, was “immune from suit for money damages.”108  The court 
found that at the time of Cromer’s termination, “existing decisions in our sister 
circuits had given First Amendment protection to speech like Cromer’s, that 
is, a police officer’s expressions of concern about racial discrimination and 
animus in his agency.”109  Specifically, “the First Amendment does not allow 
state officials to take adverse employment action against an employee who 
speaks out about the practice of racial discrimination in a law enforcement 
 
 99. Id. at 76. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 102. Id. Cromer held the position of captain, was demoted to lieutenant, and then 
was fired. Id. Cromer also alleged that his termination was due to racial discrimination, 
but that will not be discussed in this note, as it is outside of the scope. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1320. 
 104. Id. at 1321. 
 105. There is a distinction for purposes of damages between liability in one’s 
individual or official capacity.  Pursuing action against the sheriff in his individual 
capacity seeks to impose personal liability, while pursuing action against the sheriff 
in his official capacity as a state official seeks to recover from the state treasury of 
which the officer is an agent. Bench Book – 5.3.1.1 Official Capacity versus Individual 
Capacity, INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION (2020), 
https://www.interstatecompact.org/bench-book/ch5/5-3-1-1-official-capacity-versus-
individual-capacity [https://perma.cc/F44L-T2NJ] (last visited March 16, 2021).  
 106. Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1318. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1329. 
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agency.”110  Finally, under Harlow, the court held “any reasonable official in 
[the sheriff’s] shoes would have realized he would violate the Constitution if 
he fired Cromer for speaking of widely held concerns about racial 
discrimination in the sheriff’s office.”111 
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
heard a wrongful termination in violation of the First Amendment suit brought 
by a police officer against the department’s chief of police.112  The officer had 
voiced concerns that the chief had stolen money from the evidence room, 
which were based mainly on the chief being manager over the evidence 
room.113  The district court denied the chief’s motion for summary judgment 
based on qualified immunity, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed.114  The court 
found the statements addressed public concern, there was no evidence of 
disruption of the office operations, there was a jury question on the element 
of causation, and the evidence was not strong enough for judgment on a matter 
of law.115  Additionally, “a reasonable police chief could have lawfully 
terminated [the officer] for his misconduct and could have considered [the] 
termination proper, even if motivated in substantial part by an unlawful 
motive [the] termination … was objectively reasonable for purposes of 
qualified immunity.”116 
3. Appellate Court Cases Involving Campaign-Related Speech 
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard a 
First Amendment retaliation case where deputies were transferred to less-
desirable positions after announcing they were running for the sheriff’s 
position.117  These transfers were for an indefinite time, and “[a]lthough the 
transfers did not result in a decrease in pay, each man considered his transfer 
a demotion.”118  The district court found in favor of the sheriff, finding 
qualified immunity provided protection.119  First, the court found that a 
transfer alone was enough to deprive the plaintiff employees of their rights.120  
These positions were “not as interesting or prestigious” as their previous jobs, 
even if there was no reduction in salary.121  Appellate level precedent had 
established that “the law was established clearly enough in this circuit in 
January 1988 that a reasonable officer should have known that if he retaliated 
 
 110. Id. at 1330. 
 111. Id. at 1331. 
 112. Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1288–94. 
 116. Id. at 1297–98. 
 117. Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 111. 
 121. Id. at 110. 
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against an employee for exercising his First Amendment rights, he could not 
escape liability by demoting and transferring the employee rather than 
discharging him.”122  Therefore, the court concluded the district court erred in 
finding the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity.123 
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard 
a case involving a sheriff allegedly refusing to reappoint deputy sheriffs in 
retaliation of their support for his political opponent in the election for 
sheriff.124  This support took the form of speaking with others in their 
respective neighborhoods about the opposing candidate and encouraging yard 
signs in their yards, car bumper stickers on their own cars and yard signs, and 
attending a political dinner while sitting at the opposing party’s table.125  After 
he took office, the sheriff did not rehire the deputies, citing reasons of 
frequenting “an adult entertainment club” and receiving complaints about the 
handling of several rape cases.126  The district court denied the sheriff’s 
motion for summary judgment based on his qualified immunity claim.127  The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the sheriff was not 
protected by qualified immunity.128  First, the court found that the sheriff had 
not demonstrated that the deputy sheriffs may be dismissed due to their 
political affiliation.129  Next, the court determined the law was sufficiently 
clear that “a reasonable official would have understood that taking such an 
action against them for political reasons was unconstitutional.”130 
In 2014, the Eighth Circuit heard a case brought by a deputy sheriff 
alleging First Amendment retaliation after the deputy ran against the current 
sheriff.131  The sheriff did not claim the campaign was interfered with in any 
way, and ultimately, the sheriff won the election.132  The day after the election, 
the sheriff fired the deputy sheriff, after being told by the human resources 
consultant and attorney that the sheriff was within his authority to terminate 
the deputy.133  This termination caused “some unrest in the County and 
resulted in a recall election,” which the sheriff also won.134  During the recall 
campaign, the sheriff “made statements that [the deputy] was fired in 
accordance with an unwritten rule that deputy sheriffs who run against the 
sheriff will be fired and for certain statements [the deputy] made during the 
 
 122. Id. at 111. 
 123. Id. at 113. 
 124. Heggen v. Lee, 284 F.3d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 679. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 678. 
 129. Id. at 686. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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campaign.”135  The deputy’s speech included that the sherrif “should not be 
running for office because his health was so bad,” that his wife did not want 
him to run for sheriff, and that the sheriff was going to resign in two years and 
run for state senate.136  The district court denied the sheriff’s summary 
judgment motion that asserted a qualified immunity defense.137  The Eighth 
Circuit reversed.138  The court found that “based upon … precedent and a fair 
reading of North Dakota Attorney General opinions on the subject, a North 
Dakota sheriff, in light of pre-existing law, could, and perhaps should, believe 
that his deputies are at will employees.”139  The court recognized that “the 
latitude the courts accord a managing law enforcement officer in executing 
his official duties, including the hiring and firing of employees-especially 
subordinate officers.”140  The court acknowledged that “Supreme Court 
precedent strongly implies that some speech may be protected and some may 
not,” but that political speech deserves First Amendment protection, while 
false factual statements have diminished value.141  Therefore, the court held  
(1) that at least some of [the deputy’s] campaign speech does not merit 
First Amendment protection…; (2) that even if [the deputy’s] speech 
was fully protected by the Constitution, [the sheriff] could have 
reasonably believed that the speech would be at least potentially 
damaging to and disruptive of the discipline and harmony of and 
among co-workers in the sheriff’s office and detrimental to the close 
working relationships and personal loyalties necessary for an effective 
and trusted local policing operation … and the above-mentioned 
adverse employer-employee circumstance did not need to become 
manifest in order to be acted upon promptly …; (3) that … [the sheriff] 
could have logically and rationally believed that his decision to 
terminate [the deputy] was well within the breathing room accorded 
him as a public official in making a reasonable, even if mistaken, 
judgment under the circumstances…; and thus (4) [the sheriff] is 
entitled to qualified immunity to shield him from liability claimed to 
have arise through violation of the First Amendment as asserted.142 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Morgan, the Eighth Circuit first discussed that “an immediate appeal 
is appropriate…if the moving party claims qualified immunity…because 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137. Id. at 738. 
 138. Id. at 737. 
 139. Id. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 742–43. 
 142. Id. at 743 (internal citations omitted).  
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immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”143  
The court established the standard of review for a denial “of summary 
judgment based on qualified immunity” is de novo.144   
Next, the court gave background on the doctrine of qualified immunity, 
which “shields officials from civil liability in [Section] 1983 actions when 
their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”145  The court cited 
the two-step qualified immunity analysis used in Eighth Circuit precedent: 
“Qualified immunity analysis requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the 
facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or 
statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time 
of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”146  Unless both of those inquiries are 
answered affirmatively, the “appellate is entitled to qualified immunity.”147  
Finally, courts are allowed to use their “sound discretion in deciding which of 
the two prongs … should be addressed first.”148 
The court began its analysis by stating it was unnecessary to consider the 
issue of whether there was “genuine issue of material factors” surrounding 
Morgan’s termination, which would go to the first prong analysis, because the 
second prong was not satisfied.149  In other words, “Robinson did not violate 
a clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”150   
A clearly-established statutory or constitutional right is a right that is 
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that 
what he is doing violates that right.”151  Further, a clearly-established right 
should be “particularized to the facts of the case”152 rather than “defined at a 
high level of generality.”153  Precedent must exist that makes the right question 
 
 143. Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Division of 
Emp’t Sec. v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2017)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 146. Id. (citing Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2014)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148. Id.  (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 149. Id. (citing Morgan v. Robinson, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *5 
(D. Neb. Dec. 8, 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (Mar. 21, 2018), on reh’g en banc, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019), 
and rev’d and remanded, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 150. Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). 
 151. Id. (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). 
 152. Id. at 524 (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 153. Id. at 523 (same) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“beyond debate.”154  The policy behind qualified immunity is that it “gives 
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 
judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.”155   
The court determined there was a clearly established right when Morgan 
was terminated by analogizing to Nord v. Walsh.156  This Eighth Circuit case 
determined the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity due to established 
state and federal law, and advice the sheriff received from the county attorney 
and the human resources consultant.157  Further, the sheriff’s department 
“enforces the police powers in the county” with a small department, and the 
sheriff “has the power to appoint and terminate deputies.”158  Finally, the 
sheriff “has an interest in maintaining the efficient operation of the office.”159   
The court found two distinctions with Nord but determined neither 
demanded a different outcome.160  First, the speech in this case concerned 
“matters of public concern,” while in Nord the speech concerned personal 
attacks at the sheriff.161  Second, there was no disruption in Nord, and here, 
“Robinson testified he believed Morgan’s statements were detrimental to the 
office, harmful to morale, and adversely impacted the public’s trust of the 
office” and deputies held the same beliefs.162  In fact, the “entire command 
staff,” which consisted of five deputies, recommended Morgan be 
terminated.163   
The court acknowledged that Nord was decided one month after Morgan 
was fired.164  However, the court maintained that Nord supports Robinson, 
because the facts are similar, the “decision held the law was not clearly 
established in November 2010,” and “[n]either Morgan nor this court finds 
any intervening law that clearly established the law before his termination.”165  
Therefore, it follows that “the constitutional question was not beyond debate 
in May 2014.”166 
Even if Robinson could not advance evidence of this disruption, 
Robinson could still claim qualified immunity because “there is no necessity 
 
 154. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).  
 155. Id. at 524 (citing Stanton v. Wims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 156. Id.; Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2014); see supra section 
III.A.2.  
 157. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 524; Nord, 757 F.3d at 743–45. 
 158. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 524; see NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1704.01. 
 159. Id. at 525.; Morgan v. Robinson, 881 F.3d 646, 653–54 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 160. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 525. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 526. 
 165. Id. at 526–27. 
 166. Id. at 527 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of 
the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before 
taking action.”167  This concern is even more apparent with the sheriff’s job 
because of his duty to manage, hire, and fire subordinate officers.168  The facts 
here, specifically “[t]he termination letter, Robinson’s testimony, and the 
testimony of five other deputies,” demonstrate that Robinson “could have 
reasonably believed that Morgan’s speech was at least potentially damaging 
to and disruptive of the discipline and harmony of and among co-workers in 
the sheriff’s office and detrimental to the close working relationships and 
personal loyalties necessary for an effective and trusted local policing 
operation.”169  Therefore, “[a]t the time of Morgan’s termination, the law was 
not sufficiently clear so that Robinson would have known that terminating 
him violated his First Amendment rights”170 and Robinson is shielded by 
qualified immunity.171 
The dissent, authored by Judge Shepherd,  argues it was proper to affirm 
the district court’s denial of Robinson’s qualified immunity and focused on 
the majority’s alleged error in “rest[ing] on the impermissible factual finding” 
that Robinson terminated Morgan because of the “potentially damaging and 
disruptive consequences” of the campaign speech.172  Conversely, the dissent 
argues that when viewing the record in favor of Morgan, which is “the proper 
lens of a summary judgment appeal,” Robinson had instead terminated 
Morgan solely because of the campaign speech.173  The dissent rests on the 
contention that the majority failed to adhere to precedent regarding the proper 
standard of review.174   
Under the proper standard, the dissent first found that Morgan’s 
campaign statements were made as a citizen and addressed matters of public 
concern, which “lies at the heart of the First Amendment” and can trigger a 
First Amendment claim.175  Next, the dissent stated it was unreasonable for 
Robinson to use the potentially damaging and disruptive rationale176 for 
Morgan’s termination because of the “significant evidence” of the termination 
being based on the campaign speech that “challeng[ed] Robinson’s record and 
call[ed] attention to his view of the status of Sheriff Department 
 
 167. Id. at 525  (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152, 154 (1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168. Id. at 526; Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2014).  
 169. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 526; Nord, 757 F.3d at 743. 
 170. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 527 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 
(2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171. Id. at 527. 
 172. Id. (Shepherd, Kelly, and Erickson, JJ., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 527–28. 
 174. Id. at 528. 
 175. Id. at 530–31. 
 176. Id. at 525–26 (majority opinion); Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 743 (8th 
Cir. 2014). 
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operations.”177  Finally, the dissent would find it is clearly established that 
Robinson could not terminate Morgan for the campaign speech because 
Robinson could not have reasonably believed at the time of termination that 
“a government employer could fire an employee on account of the employee 
exercising his First Amendment right to free speech during a run for political 
office where that speech had no disruptive impact on office functioning.”178  
The dissent also criticizes the majority’s reliance on Nord v. Walsh, stating 
“the majority diminishes critical distinctions in Nord,” specifically that Nord 
spoke out about “the sheriff’s personal attributes and fitness for office” and 
Morgan, conversely, addressed department-wide operation issues.179 
V. COMMENT  
Although the procedural pitfalls of a First Amendment retaliation claim 
involving a qualified immunity defense can make comparing cases and 
jurisdictional trends difficult, other aspects of this particular claim add to the 
confusion.  Differences between circuits create confusing standards for 
plaintiffs and subordinates to follow and base their claims on.  It is worth 
noting, however, that some of these differences may be inevitable, as the 
analysis is fact specific, and the law is consistently changing.  If at the time of 
the decision the law is established, it may change before the court hears 
another case on the same qualified immunity issue.  For example, the Sixth 
Circuit, seventeen years before Morgan, found no qualified immunity in a 
case involving termination based on political opponent support in an election 
for sheriff.180  Contrarily, the Eleventh Circuit, nineteen years before Morgan, 
held that qualified immunity applied where a police officer was fired allegedly 
in retaliation for accusing the police chief of theft.181  Even in the Eighth 
Circuit, within a matter of one year, the law changed so that qualified 
immunity applied to Robinson.  Another difference in the two Morgan 
decisions out of the Eighth Circuit is that the first was heard by a panel of 
three judges,182 while the second was heard en banc.  The preceding reasons 
are just a handful of existing factors that make these types of cases extremely 
unpredictable. 
  Cases involving a qualified immunity defense make success unlikely, 
as “suits against governmental officials almost never succeed.”183  It is notable 
 
 177. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 532 (Shepherd, Kelly, and Erickson, JJ., dissenting). 
 178. Id. at 533. 
 179. Id. at 535. 
 180. Heggen v. Lee, 284 F.3d 675, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 181. Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 182. The three-judge panel was Judges Benton, Shepherd, and Kelly. Morgan, 881 
F.3d at 649. 
 183. George Leef, Qualified Immunity – A Rootless Doctrine The Court Should 
Jettison, FORBES (March 21, 2018, 9:53 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2018/03/21/qualified-immunity-a-rootless-
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that sheriffs generally have “absolute control over the selection and retention 
of deputy sheriffs.”184  Further, the sheriff is “generally given broad authority 
in the selection and dismissal of deputies, both because the sheriff is 
responsible for the neglects and defaults of a deputy and so that law 
enforcement can be centralized in the county.”185  This creates a pretty high 
bar for sheriffs to be found to not have acted in an objectively reasonable 
manner.  This thought is stated well in the dissent of Morgan: “Sheriff 
Robinson terminated Morgan’s employment solely because of his personal 
objections to the content of Morgan’s campaign speech without the reasonable 
belief that the statements would have a disruptive effect on the operation of 
the Sheriff’s department.”186   
The doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to shield government 
officials, but it has resulted in excusing egregious government action in many 
cases.  Courts across the United States each year “grant government officials 
qualified immunity in decisions that describe tragic facts and outrageous 
behavior.”187  For example, “defendants who have searched homes without 
probable cause, stolen property in police custody, fabricated evidence, and 
used excessive force are shielded from liability.”188 
The need for and justifications of protecting officials when exercising 
their decisions in regard to their official authority is apparent; however, 
because Harlow largely removed the subjective element of the qualified 
immunity defense, it is likely that a sheriff with personal vendettas against a 
subordinate could articulate an objectively reasonable basis for the 
termination, even if there was subjective intent behind it.  Further, actual 
disruption is not a prerequisite to advance a qualified immunity defense and 
punishment is permitted for speech on issues of public concern.  Harlow 
increases the risk that subordinates could suffer wrongful termination based 
on personal issues because it gives wide protection and discretion to sheriffs 
and other officers, leaving those individuals no option for recourse.  
Specific to the First Amendment, Harlow might invite corruption into 
the system and discourage improvement.  By protecting government actors, 
such as sheriffs, through qualified immunity, it could provoke a fear to speak 
out about current problems in a system.  If an individual knows they may lose 
their job if they attempt to speak out and implement change, they may decide 




 184. Romualdo P. Eclavea and Alan J. Jacobs, Appointment or election – Of 
deputy sheriffs, in 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police, and Constables § 14 (November 
2020 Update).  
 185. Id. 
 186. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 527–28 (Shepherd, Kelly and Erickson, JJ., dissenting). 
 187. Joanna Schwartz, Imagining a World Without Qualified Immunity, Part I, 
REASON (Sept. 16, 2019, 8:03 AM), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2019/09/16/imagining-a-world-without-qualified-
immunity-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/VLG9-Y6JC]. 
 188. Id. 
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actor will be shielded from liability, it would require actively keeping up with 
appellate specific decisions, drastically inhibiting one’s freedom to speak 
when and how they would like.   
VI. CONCLUSION  
The Supreme Court has advanced three justifications for qualified 
immunity: (1) “it derives from a common law ‘good faith’ defense”; (2) “it 
compensates for an earlier putative mistake in broadening the statute”; and (3) 
“it provides ‘fair warning’ to government officials, akin to the rule of 
lenity.”189  By examining the modern state of the qualified immunity defense, 
however, it is clear the articulated justifications of the defense do not stand up 
to the negatives it produces today.  The doctrine has been interpreted in 
various ways by lower courts, causing a world of uncertainty and unfairness 
when a victim of egregious government action seeks a monetary remedy.  
Government officials are shielded from anything that is clearly established at 
the time of the action, which results in that official escaping liability in a 
majority of the cases.  While this deters meritless lawsuits, it also deters valid 
suits that will not be pursued given the uncertainty and hurdles that plaintiff 
faces.  
Specific to the First Amendment, shielding government actors who take 
retaliatory action creates an environment of fear, where improvements will be 
hard to advocate for and implement, and corruption is not uncommon.  Given 
the wide latitude a sheriff is granted when managing his department, he should 
be protected by the same level of employee protection as a regular, 
nongovernmental citizen when it comes to retaliatory actions against an 
opposing party in an election.   
 
 
 189. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 46 
(2018). 
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